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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
William Troy Hedgecock appeals from the Judgment of Conviction Upon a Plea
of Guilty to One Felony Count, and Order of Commitment. After the district court denied
his motion to suppress, Mr. Hedgecock entered a conditional plea of guilty to the charge
of possession of forged bank bills. Although Mr. Hedgecock had waived his right to be
free from unreasonable searches as a condition of his probation, he did not waive his
right to be free from unreasonable seizures.

Mr. Hedgecock asserts that the district

court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence because the right to be free from
unreasonable seizures, protected by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution and Article I § 17 of the Idaho Constitution, was violated
when law enforcement officers improperly seized him without reasonable suspicion or
prior consent, and as such, the evidence derived from the improper seizure must be
suppressed.
Furthermore, Mr. Hedgecock asserts that the district court abused its discretion
in sentencing him to an excessive sentence without properly considering the mitigating
factors in his case.

Further, Mr. Hedgecock asserts that the district court abused its

discretion by denying his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion for a
reduction of sentence.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On December 19, 2005, an Information was filed charging Mr. Hedgecock with
possession of forged bank bills. (R., pp.11-12.) Mr. Hedgecock entered a guilty plea to
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the charge.

(R., pp.18-19.)

However, because of some confusion as to the plea

agreement, Mr. Hedgecock was allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. (R., pp.20-29.)
Mr. Hedgecock then filed a Motion to Suppress "statements the defendant made
and evidence seized in violation of the defendant's rights under the United States
Constitution and Idaho State Constitution." (R., pp.38-39.)

The district court held a

hearing on the motion. (R., pp.40-42.)
The first witness to testify was Mr. Neumeyer, a senior probation and parole
officer.

(Tr.10/3/06, p.11, Ls.13-25.)

In November of 2005, Mr. Neumeyer was

supervising Mr. Hedgecock who was on felony probation for unrelated charges.
(Tr. 10/3/06, p.12, Ls.8-12.)

Mr. Neumeyer went to Mr. Hedgecock's residence to

conduct an initial home visit and search. (Tr. 10/3/06, p.13, Ls.6-18.)

Mr. Neumeyer

and three other felony probation officers arrived at the residence, discovered
Mr. Hedgecock's roommate at the apartment, and learned that Mr. Hedgecock was not
home. (Tr. 10/3/06, p.13, L.21 - p.14, L.21.)
During the search of the apartment, three officers from the Gooding County
Sheriff's Office and an officer from the Wendell Police Department, Officer Waugh,
arrived at the scene. (Tr. 10/3/06, p.15, Ls.21-25.) Officer Waugh told Mr. Neumeyer
that he had stopped an SUV a week or more ago and that Mr. Hedgecock had been a
passenger in the vehicle.

(Tr. 10/3/06, p.19, L.21 - p.20, L.14.) At some point the

officers were standing on the balcony of the apartment and noticed a vehicle pull up to a
stop sign about 50 yards away. (Tr. 10/3/06, p.19, Ls.3-19.) Officer Waugh pointed at
the vehicle and identified it as being the same SUV that he had stopped Mr. Hedgecock
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I

in previously.

(Tr. 10/3/06, p.20, Ls.13-14.)

The vehicle did not belong to

Mr. Hedgecock. (Tr. 10/3/06, p.25, Ls.1-3.)
At around 11 :30 p.m., Mr. Neumeyer was able to view the SUV stopped at the
stop sign for a couple of seconds, noticed there were people in the SUV, although he
was unable to tell who they were, and observed the SUV accelerate quickly away from
the stop sign at about 25 to 30 miles an hour. (Tr. 10/3/06, p.21, Ls.4-15.) Based upon
his observation and the information from Officer Waugh, Mr. Neumeyer requested that a
couple of the county officers stop the vehicle to "see if Mr. Hedgecock was actually in
that vehicle." (Tr. 10/3/06, p.23, Ls.16-21.) He also requested that if Mr. Hedgecock
was in the SUV that the officers check the vehicle and detain Mr. Hedgecock until
Mr. Neumeyer arrived at the scene. (Tr. 10/3/06, p.24, Ls.9-11.)
Two officers stopped the vehicle and discovered that Mr. Hedgecock was inside.
(Tr. 10/3/06, p.25, L.19 - p.26, L.1.) When Mr. Neumeyer arrived, Mr. Hedgecock had
been removed from the SUV.

(Tr. 10/3/06, p.26, Ls.12-14.)

He requested that

Mr. Hedgecock be detained and that the officers search the vehicle again. {Tr. 10/3/06,
p.26, Ls.17-20.) Mr. Neumeyer had wanted to detain Mr. Hedgecock to question him
about a scanner they had found at his home and to inform him that they had found
illegal drugs on his roommate, making it inappropriate for Mr. Hedgecock to continue
living in the residence. (Tr. 10/3/06, p.27, Ls.4-21.)
During the detention, Mr. Hedgecock admitted that he had been using
methamphetamines.

(Tr. 10/3/06, p.28, Ls.12-25.)

Another officer came over and

informed Mr. Neumeyer that during the search they had discovered some counterfeit
$100 bills in the center console.

(Tr. 10/3/06, p.29, Ls.7-14.)
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Mr. Hedgecock was

Mirandized1 and then admitted that the bills were counterfeit and the original was in his

wallet.

(Tr. 10/3/06, p.30, Ls.5-24.)

After locating the original bill in his wallet,

Mr. Hedgecock was arrested. (Tr. 10/3/06, p.33, Ls.7-10.)
On cross examination, Mr. Neumeyer admitted that there were no warrants for
Mr. Hedgecock's arrest and there were no pending probation violations. (Tr. 10/3/06,
p.34, Ls.7-13.) Mr. Neumeyer admitted that there was no basis to pull the vehicle over
other than his request that the officers do so. (Tr. 10/3/06, p.39, Ls.3-6.) At this time,
the State stipulated that the only reason the officers stopped the vehicle was based
upon Mr. Neumeyer's request. (Tr. 10/3/06, p.39, Ls.7-9.) Mr. Neumeyer also admitted
that the word "seizure" did not appear anywhere in Mr. Hedgecock's conditions of
probation. (Tr. 10/3/06, p.40, L.4 - p.43, L.3.)
The second witness was Officer Kiger.

(Tr. 10/3/06, p.44, Ls.16-24.) Officer

Kiger was asked by Mr. Neumeyer to stop the vehicle that had been seen near the
apartment.

(Tr. 10/3/06, p.45, Ls.14-20.)

committed by the driver of the vehicle.

He did not observe any traffic violations

(Tr. 10/3/06, p.45, Ls.21-25.)

Officer Kiger

discovered a woman was driving the vehicle and Mr. Hedgecock was in the passenger
seat. (Tr. 10/3/06, p.46, L.5 - p.47, L.13.) He requested that Mr. Hedgecock exit the
vehicle and detained him until Mr. Neumeyer arrived at the scene, about five minutes
later. (Tr. 10/3/06, p.47, L.15 - p.48, L.17.) After Mr. Neumeyer arrived, the officer
searched the vehicle. (Tr. 10/3/06, p.48, Ls.18-24.)
Mr. Hedgecock was the next witness to testify.

(Tr. 10/3/06, p.52, Ls.12-23.)

Mr. Hedgecock testified that the windows in the SUV were darkly tinted. (Tr. 10/3/06,
p.54, Ls.9-12.) When the vehicle was stopped officers ordered him out at gun point, he
1

See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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was placed in handcuffs, and the vehicle was searched immediately, prior to
Mr. Neumeyer arriving on scene. (Tr. 10/3/06, p.55, L.12 - p.57, L.10.)
Mr. Hedgecock and the female driver had been pulled over about three weeks
prior to the night in question.

(Tr. 10/3/06, p.58, Ls.8-21.)

He was positive that

everything was legal with the car on the night in question because the two had renewed
the woman's license, obtained proof of insurance, and had renewed the vehicle tags as
a result of the previous traffic stop. (Tr. 10/3/06, p.57, L.13 - p.58, L.7.)
The final witness was Deputy Smith. (Tr. 10/3/06, p.61, Ls.1-13.) Deputy Smith
was asked to search the vehicle after the stop. (Tr. 10/3/06, p.64, Ls.18-23.) Prior to
arriving at the traffic stop, Deputy Smith had been asked by Mr. Neumeyer to stop
Mr. Hedgecock if he came in contact with him. (Tr. 10/3/06, p.69, Ls.15-23.)
The district court then made the following findings:
The findings of fact that I would make are that the Defendant
Hedgecock was on probation, felony level probation; had listed an address
described in the record his at Wendell as to where he was living. [sic]
Frank Neumeyer went to that residence with other probation
officers and police officers to conduct probation business. While there,
discovered drugs on Secord, and this scanning machine.
Neumeyer was in possession of evidence - or of information from a
fellow officer that Recognizing that Waugh is a city of Wendell officer and Neumeyer
is the state probation officer, but Neumeyer was in possession of
information that Hedgecock had been stopped in the vehicle sometime
previously.
While standing at that - on the residence porch, a vehicle matching
that description pulled up. The people in it could be seen moving, but
could not be recognized as to who they were.
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The vehicle took off from the residence - or the intersection as
described here. Neumeyer instructed Kiger, Officer Kiger, who was
present with him, to stop that vehicle. Kiger in fact did stop that vehicle.
Jeromy Smith was not present with the vehicle drove by the
residence and stopped at the intersection.
Jeromy Smith was
approximately a half a mile away.
That Jeromy Smith came back to the location of the stop. That
when Smith arrived, Hedgecock was already out of the vehicle and
handcuffed. Neumeyer was present, and that is when the search of the
vehicle occurred.
So the only question that I needed legal briefing from - And in fact,
essentially, it would be that I would conditionally deny your motion to
suppress subject to being revisited, so I don't have to do a bunch of
writing, unless I can get some briefing that changes the picture.
And that is what basis does Hedgecock have to object to the
conduct here, as opposed to I can understand why the driver of the vehicle should say, "Wait a
minute, there's no basis to perform this stop." You know, no PC there.
But paint with a real fine brush what is Hedgecock's basis to object
to the conduct.

And I guess the second part would be any statement you have as
to the effect of the waiver signed by Hedgecock as to the probation - or to
the search and seizure of the passenger portion of the vehicle where the
counterfeit money was located.
(Tr. 10/3/06, p.71, L.23 - p.74, L.5.)
Following the conditional denial of the motion, defense counsel filed a
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress. (R., pp.42a-g.) In the memorandum,
Mr. Hedgecock specifically addressed the questions of whether Mr. Hedgecock had
standing to contest the stop and whether he had waived his right to be free from
unreasonable seizures. (R., pp.42a-g.) On October 31, 2006, the district court revisited
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the suppression motion.

(Tr. 10/31/06, p.78, L.1 - p.80, L13.) The district court found

that:
On October 3, 2006, I conditionally denied it. I have reviewed the
briefing. I'll again deny it. There is a case that does grant the passenger
standing but I believe that the police, and would make the finding, had a
reasonable, articulable suspicion under the totality of the circumstances;
the identity of the vehicle and so for that had been identified as the one
Hedgecock was riding in. I'll deny it.
(Tr. 10/31/06, p.79, Ls.6-14.)
Mr. Hedgecock entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the
district court's denial of the suppression motion.

(R., pp.44-48.) At sentencing, the

prosecution recommended a unified fourteen year sentence, leaving the fixed portion to
the district court's discretion. (Tr. 1/23/07, p.80, Ls.1-20.) Defense counsel requested
that the district court impose a two year fixed sentence, leaving the indeterminate
portion of the sentence up to the district court's discretion. (Tr. 1/23/07, p.83, Ls.17-19.)
The district court imposed a unified sentence of fourteen years, with seven years fixed.
(R., pp.52-57.) Mr. Hedgecock filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's
Judgment of Conviction Upon a Plea of Guilty to One Felony Count, and Order of
Commitment. (R., pp.59-61.) Mr. Hedgecock also filed a timely Idaho Criminal Rule 35
motion. (R., pp.63-64.) The motion was denied. (R., pp.67-72.)
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ISSUES
1.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Hedgecock's motion to suppress?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed, upon Mr. Hedgecock,
a unified sentence of fourteen years, with seven years fixed, following his plea of
guilty to possession of forged bank bills?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Hedgecock's Idaho
Criminal Rule 35 Motion for a Reduction of Sentence?

8

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Hedgecock's Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
Mr. Hedgecock's right to be free from unreasonable seizures was violated when

officers illegally seized him. Without reasonable articulable suspicion, based only upon
the officers' mere hunch that Mr. Hedgecock may be inside the vehicle, officers stopped
a vehicle in which Mr. Hedgecock was a passenger. Mr. Hedgecock had not waived his
right to be free from unreasonable seizures as a condition of his probation, and
therefore, officers could not seize him without reasonable suspicion.

As such, the

district court's order denying Mr. Hedgecock's motion to suppress should be reversed.

B.

Standard Of Review
The review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. State v. Lafferty, 139 Idaho

336, 338, 79 P.3d 157, 159 (Ct. App. 2003). When a decision on a motion to suppress
is challenged, the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence
are accepted; however, the application of constructional principles to the facts as found
are freely reviewed. State v. McCall, 135 Idaho 885, 886, 26 P.3d 1222, 1223 (2001).
At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of all witnesses, weigh
evidence, resolve factual conflicts and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial
court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995).
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I~
C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Hedgecock's Motion To Suppress
The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."
U.S. Const. amend. IV; Idaho Const. Art. I, § 17. The purpose of these constitutional
rights is to "impose a standard of reasonableness upon the exercise of discretion by
governmental agents and thereby safeguard an individual's privacy and security against
arbitrary invasions." State v. Maddox, 137 Idaho 821, 824, 54 P.3d 464,467 (Ct. App.
2002) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-654 (1979)). The United States
Supreme Court has held that when evidence is obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, the judicially developed exclusionary rule usually precludes its use in a
criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal search and seizure. Illinois v. Krull,
480 U.S. 340, 347 (1987) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United
;

States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)).

1.

The Officer's Lacked Reasonable Suspicion To Stop The Vehicle

The Fourth Amendment safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures
applies to the seizures of persons through detentions falling short of arrest or an arrest.

United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
16 (1968). The stop of a vehicle constitutes a seizure of its occupants and is, therefore,
subject to the Fourth Amendment restraints. State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 208, 953
P.2d 645, 648 (Ct. App. 1998). A vehicle stop is of limited magnitude compared to other
types of seizures; however, it is nonetheless a "constutionally cognizable" intrusion and
therefore my not be conducted "at the unbridled discretion of law enforcement officials."

Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661.
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When the purpose of the detention is to investigate a possible traffic offense or
other crime, it must be based upon reasonable, aritculable suspicion of criminal activity.
State v. Schumacher, 136 Idaho 509, 37 P.3d 6 (Ct. App. 2001); Florida v. Royer, 460

U.S. 491, 498 (1983).

Although the required information leading to formation of

reasonable suspicion in the mind of the police officer is less than the information
required to form probable cause, it still "must be more than mere speculation or a hunch
on the part of the police officer." State v. Cerino, 141 Idaho 736, 738, 117 P.3d 876,
878 (Ct. App. 2005). The reasonableness of the officer's suspicion is evaluated based
upon the totality of the circumstances at the time of the seizure. Flowers, 131 Idaho at
208, 953 P.2d at 648.

A passenger in the vehicle has standing to contest the

reasonableness of an investigatory stop of the vehicle as well as its continued
detention. State v. Haworth, 106 Idaho 405, 679 P.2d 1123 (1984); State v. Luna, 126
Idaho 235, 237, 880 P.2d 265, 267 (Ct. App. 1994); U.S. v. Twilley, 222 F.3d 1092 (9th
Cir. 2000).
In the case at hand, there was not reasonable articulable suspicion to stop the
vehicle.

The only information available to officers was that Officer Waugh had told

Mr. Neumeyer that he had stopped an SUV, which did not belong to Mr. Hedgecock, a
week or more ago and that Mr. Hedgecock had been a passenger in that vehicle.
(Tr. 10/3/06, p.19, L.21 - p.20, L.14, p.25, Ls.1-3.) A vehicle pulled up to a stop sign
about 50 yards away which matched the description of the vehicle Mr. Hedgecock had
been seen in weeks earlier. (Tr. 10/3/06, p.19, Ls.3-19.) Officer Waugh pointed at this
vehicle and identified it as being the same vehicle that he had stopped Mr. Hedgecock
in previously.

(Tr. 10/3/06, p.20, Ls.13-14.)
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It was approximately 11 :30 p.m. and

although Mr. Neumeyer was able to see people in the vehicle, he was unable to identify
the people. (Tr. 10/3/06, p.21, Ls.4-15.) The vehicle accelerated quickly away from the
stop sign at about 25 to 30 miles an hour. (Tr. 10/3/06, p.21, Ls.4-15.) There were no
warrants for Mr. Hedgecock's arrest and there were no pending probation violations.
(Tr. 10/3/06, p.34, Ls.7-13.)
Based upon this information, Mr. Neumeyer requested that county officers stop
the vehicle to "see if Mr. Hedgecock was actually in that vehicle." (Tr. 10/3/06, p.23,
Ls.16-21.) Officer Kiger, who effectuated the stop, did not observe any traffic violations
committed by the driver of the vehicle. (Tr. 10/3/06, p.45, Ls.21-25.) Mr. Neumeyer
admitted that there was no basis to pull the vehicle over other than his request that the
officers do so. (Tr. 10/3/06, p.39, Ls.3-6.) Additionally, the State stipulated that the only
reason the officers stopped the vehicle was based upon Mr. Neumeyer's request.
(Tr. 10/3/06, p.39, Ls.7-9.)
Mr. Neumeyer had only a mere speculation or hunch that Mr. Hedgecock was
inside the vehicle. His testimony reflects that he did not know whether Mr. Hedgecock
was in vehicle, as he wanted it stopped in order to determine if he was actually inside
the vehicle. Mr. Hedgecock's presence in the vehicle, on one occasion, weeks prior the
night in question, can not provide reasonable suspicion that he was in the vehicle at that
time.

It is absurd to find that by riding in a vehicle, on one occasion, that it would be

reasonable to assume that every time the vehicle is driven, the same individuals are
again located inside the vehicle.

Looking at the totality of circumstances, neither

Mr. Neumeyer nor any other officer present had
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reasonable

suspicion

that

Mr. Hedgecock was in the vehicle. Further, there was no reasonable suspicion that a
traffic violation had occurred.
Therefore, the district court's finding that, "I believe that the police, and would
make the finding, had a reasonable, articulable suspicion under the totality of the
circumstances; the identity of the vehicle and so for that had been identified as the one
Hedgecock was riding in," is not based upon substantial competent evidence.
(Tr. 10/31/06, p.79, Ls.6-14.) As such, the district court erred in finding that there was
reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle.
2.

Mr. Hedgecock Could Not Be Seized Pursuant To His Probation
Agreement

Although the district court failed to address the question of whether
Mr. Hedgecock had waived his right to be free from unreasonable seizures, stopping the
analysis at the question of whether the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop the
vehicle, Mr. Hedgecock asserts that he did not waive this right as a condition of his
probation. As such, his probationary agreement cannot be used to provide alternate
grounds for the unreasonable seizure.
A probation agreement is similar to a contractual agreement.

In case of

ambiguous contract terms, the contract is to be construed in favor of the non-drafting
party, in this case Mr. Hedgecock. Haener v. Ada County Highway Dist. 108 Idaho 170,
173, 697 P.2d 1184, 1187 {1985). When reviewing the probationary terms, it is clear
that Mr. Hedgecock did not waive his right to be free from unreasonable seizures.
Conditions of probation, especially a waiver of a Fourth Amendment right, cannot be
implied. State v. Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 496, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006).

13

Mr. Hedgecock's conditions of probation include the following relevant sections:
1.
LAWS AND COOPERATION: I shall respect and obey all laws
and comply with any lawful request of my supervising officer, any agent of
the Division of Community Corrections, or any police officer.
6.
SEARCH: I agree and consent to the search of my person,
automobile, real property, and any other property at any time at any place
by any Agent of the Division of Community Corrections or any police
officer and waive my constitutional right to be free from searches.
10.
Submit to Searches: The defendant shall submit to a search of
his/her person, residence or vehicle at the request of any Probation Officer
or a police officer.
(R., p.42d; Augmentation: Judgment of Conviction Upon a Plea of Guilty to Two Felony
Counts, Suspending Sentence and Order of Supervised Probation I.C. 19-2601 (2).)
Idaho courts

have

acknowledged

that

probationers

have

a

diminished

expectation of privacy and will enforce Fourth Amendment waivers as a condition of
probation. State v. Cruz, 144 Idaho 906, _ , 174 P.3d 876, 878 (Ct. App. 2007). Even
when there is no warrantless search condition, a probation officer may conduct a search
of a probationer and his or her residence if the officer has "reasonable grounds" to
believe that they have violated a probation condition and the search is reasonably
related to the disclosure of confirmation of that violation. Id.
In the case at hand, there were no "reasonable grounds" to seize Mr. Hedgecock.
Officers did not have any information that he had violated the terms of his probation.
Mr. Neumeyer testified that there were no warrants for Mr. Hedgecock's arrest and
there were no pending probation violations. (Tr. 10/3/06, p.34, Ls.7-13.) Further, the
only item that officers located which could be attributed to Mr. Hedgecock was a
scanner. (Tr. 10/3/06, p.34, Ls.14-17.) Mr. Neumeyer specifically noted that it was not
illegal for a probationer to possess a scanner.
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(Tr. 10/3/06, p.34, Ls.18-20.)

Additionally, there were no reports of Mr. Hedgecock's involvement in any possible
criminal activity.

As such, officers did not have "reasonable grounds" to believe

Mr. Hedgecock had violated a probation condition and could not properly seize him
based upon those grounds.
In Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 126 S.Ct. 2193 (2006), the United States
Supreme Court held that a completely suspicionless search of the parolee on a public
street was reasonable because parolees had a diminished expectation of privacy due to
the State's interest in supervising parolees outweighing the parolee's privacy interest.
Id., 547 U.S. at ----, 126 S. Ct. at 2197-02.

The Supreme Court reasoned that

probationers have greater expectations of privacy than parolees. Id., 547 U.S. at---- &
n. 2, 126 S. Ct. at 2198 & n. 2. The Court also renounced the proposition that parolees,
like prisoners, have no Fourth Amendment rights and specifically recognized California's
prohibition against "arbitrary, capricious or harassing" parole searches. Id., 547 U.S. at
----, 126 S. Ct. at 2202.
Recently, in State v. Purdum,_ Idaho_,_ P.3d _ , 2008 WL 183377
(Ct. App. 2008) (decision not final) 2 , the Idaho Court of Appeals held that "because of
Purdum's reduced expectation of privacy as a probationer who had submitted to
'random blood, breath and or/urine analysis upon the request of ... any law enforcement
official,' the police officer was empowered to conduct a suspicionless search (i.e., drug
test) of these bodily fluids."

Id.

The Court of Appeals recognized that the "Idaho

Supreme Court has said that conditions of probation, especially a waiver of a Fourth
Amendment right, cannot be implied, an officer must be able to temporarily detain a

2

Upon opinion and belief, a Petition for Review has been filed in State v. Purdum. On the date of this
filing, the Brief in Support of Petition for Review has not yet been filed.
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probationer in order to effectuate this search condition. Any other reading would render
the provision a nullity." Id. (internal citations omitted).
Despite the holding of Purdum, Mr. Hedgecock maintains that implying a waiver
of his right to be free from unreasonable seizures is an unlawful interpretation of his
probationary agreement and would be directly at odds with the holding of State v.

Klingler. Id. at 496, 148 P.3d at 1242.
However, the case at hand is easily distinguishable from Purdum. In Purdum,
the facts provided that the officer "decided to stop Purdum and ask him to submit to a
drug test" in compliance with his probationary conditions. Purdum, 2008 WL 183377.
In the present case, no such connection between the actions of the officers and the
seizure of Mr. Hedgecock can be drawn.
As to probation condition number one, Mr. Hedgecock was required to comply
with the lawful request of law enforcement.

(R., p.42d; Augmentation: Judgment of

Conviction Upon a Plea of Guilty to Two Felony Counts, Suspending Sentence and
Order of Supervised Probation I.C. 19-2601(2).) In this case, the officers did not have
reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle, see section l(C)(1), as such the stop of the
vehicle was illegal and could not have been the product of a lawful request. Therefore,
Mr. Hedgecock should not have been required to submit to the seizure.
Probation conditions numbers six and ten required Mr. Hedgecock to consent to
and submit to a search of his person at request. (R., p.42d; Augmentation: Judgment of
Conviction Upon a Plea of Guilty to Two Felony Counts, Suspending Sentence and
Order of Supervised Probation I.C. 19-2601(2).)

At no time, prior to his unlawful

seizure, did any probation officer or law enforcement official state that they desired to
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I

detain Mr. Hedgecock to effectuate a search of his person, residence, or vehicle.
Mr. Neumeyer requested that a officers stop the vehicle in question to "see if
Mr. Hedgecock was actually in that vehicle." (Tr. 10/3/06, p.23, Ls.16-21.)

He also

requested that, if Mr. Hedgecock was in the SUV, that the officers check the vehicle,
which was known to belong to an individual other than Mr. Hedgecock, and detain
Mr. Hedgecock until Mr. Neumeyer arrived at the scene. (Tr. 10/3/06, p.24, Ls.9-11.)
Mr. Neumeyer wanted to detain Mr. Hedgecock to question him about a scanner they
had found at his home and to inform him that they had found illegal drugs on his
roommate, making it inappropriate for Mr. Hedgecock to continue living in the residence.
(Tr. 10/3/06, p.27, Ls.4-21.)

Mr. Neumeyer did not state that he wanted to detain

Mr. Hedgecock to complete a search. As such, no implied seizure was required to fulfill
Mr. Neumeyer's supervision needs.
Mr. Hedgecock's probation agreement does not contain a waiver of his right to be
free from unreasonable seizures, officers did not have "reasonable grounds" to believe
he had violated his probation, and there were no circumstances present which would
provide for an implication of a seizure waiver. As such, the seizure of Mr. Hedgecock
constituted a violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment and Article I § 17 of the
Idaho Constitution.

3.

All Evidence Collected Against Mr. Hedgecock Following The Illegal
Traffic Stop Must Be Suppressed As It Is Fruit Of The Illegal
Governmental Activity

The application of the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence is appropriate only
to evidence that is fruit of the illegal governmental activity. Segura v. United States, 468
U.S. 796, 815 (1984); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); State v.
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Bainbridge, 117 Idaho 245, 249, 787 P.2d 231, 235 (1990). The test is "whether,

granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is
made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488 (quoting
MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT, p. 221 (1959)). Suppression is required only if "the
evidence sought to be suppressed would not have come to light but for the
government's unconstitutional conduct." State v. Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180, 184, 125
P.3d 536, 540 (Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Nava-Ramirez, 210 F.3d at 1131).
In the case at hand, the above evidence clearly shows that Mr. Hedgecock was
illegally seized without reasonable suspicion or a waiver of his right to be free from
unreasonable seizures.

Had Mr. Hedgecock not been illegally seized, the evidence

located in the vehicle would not have been discovered. The State failed to meet its
burden in showing that the evidence is untainted; therefore, all the evidence collected
after the impermissible seizure must be suppressed as fruit of the illegal police activity.
11.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed, Upon Mr. Hedgecock, A
Unified Sentence Of Fourteen Years, With Seven Years Fixed, Following His Plea Of
Guilty To Possession Of Forged Bank Bills
Mr. Hedgecock asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of
fourteen years, with four years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that
the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will
conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to the nature of the
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See
State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 653 P.2d 1183 (Ct. App. 1982).
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The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294, 939 P.2d
1372, 1373 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577, 602 P.2d 71, 75
(1979)).

Mr. Hedgecock does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory

maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Hedgecock must
show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence was excessive considering any
view of the facts. Id. (citing State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141, 145, 814 P.2d 401, 405
(1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 825 P.2d 482
(1992)). The governing criteria, or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection
of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. (quoting State v.
Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384, 582 P.2d 728, 730 (1978)).

Mr. Hedgecock asserts that the district court failed to properly consider the
mitigating factors that exist in his case. Specifically, he asserts that the district court
failed to give proper consideration to his admitted substance abuse problem and desire
for treatment. Idaho courts have previously recognized that substance abuse and a
desire for treatment should be considered as a mitigating factor by the district court
when that court imposes sentence. State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 645 P.2d 323 (1982),
see also State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209, 824 P.2d 135, 140 (Ct. App. 1991).

Mr. Hedgecock began using marijuana, methamphetamine, and cocaine at the
age of thirteen. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.13.) He used
marijuana and cocaine "often" and methamphetamine "daily." (PSI, p.13.) Previously,
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Mr. Hedgecock has used heroin, mushrooms, and acid.

(PSI, p.13.) He has used

illegal substances as a major tool to cope with life issues.

(Brief Consultation and

Screening Report, dated 5/15/06, p.3.)
Mr. Hedgecock reported that he had relapsed on methamphetamine a few weeks
after being placed on probation in 2005.

In July of 2005, he began participating in

Intensive Outpatient treatment, completing the 21 required sessions in September of the
same year.

(Updated Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, UPSI} 5/18/06,

p.6.} While on bond for the case at hand, Mr. Hedgecock attended regular AA meetings
and was able to stay clean. (UPSl 5/18/06, p.3.} He admitted that he was struggling,
but was trying to remain drug free. (UPSI 5/18/06, p.3.}
Mr. Hedgecock recognizes his addiction and that he has been able to receive
some treatment; however, he also recognizes that he needs further treatment to
overcome his addition. In a letter to the district court he wrote, "I am still struggling with
my addiction, but I have learned to take responsibility for my actions. . . . I now
understand that it is up to me to make my own choices and that the choice has always
been mine." (Augmentation: Notice of Deposit, Exhibit C.} He has a strong desire to
stay sober.

(Brief Consultation and Screening Report, dated 5/15/06, p.3.)

sentencing hearing, Mr. Hedgecock told the district court that:
I have been on the street since I was 14 years old, and all l have
done is drugs. And you know, I have done a lot of wrong.

I have made many, many mistakes; and last year the first time I
ever really learned what addiction was, you know, other than - I learned
about addiction instead of just having a problem, you know. And January
of 2005 was the first time in my life that I have ever been free from
incarceration and lived, you know, sober for seven months.
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I

And when I got locked back up this time was because of a relapse.
And you know, I sat there and thought to myself, you know, what is wrong
with me. You know, why do I keep doing this. [sic]
Why, why, why. [sic] I'm tired. I'm tired of this lifestyle. I'm tired,
you know, of having to deal with this. I'm sure you guys - I know you guys
are tried of me, you know.

When I get out, I plan on checking into a treatment program down
there in Texas once I'm paroled. That is, you know, just, you know
intensify the rehab and what I need.
(Tr. 1/23/07, p.83, L.23 - p.84, L.25.)
Idaho courts have previously recognized that Idaho Code§ 19-2523 requires the
trial court to consider a defendant's mental illness as a sentencing factor. Hollon v.
State, 132 Idaho 573, 581, 976 P.2d 927, 935 (1999).

Mr. Hedgecock has been

previously diagnosed with Substance Induced Mood Disorder - Provisional, and Adult
Antisocial Personality Disorder.

(UPSI 5/18/06, p.5.)

In 2006, Mr. Hedgecock was

diagnosed with Adult Antisocial Behavior. (Brief Consultation and Screening Report,
dated 5/15/06, p.3.)

In completing testing, it was discovered that Mr. Hedgecock

suffered from a severe level of depression, experienced a high level of irrational
thinking, and presented symptoms of a mood disorder.

(Brief Consultation and

Screening Report, dated 5/15/06, p.3.) Mr. Hedgecock believes that he would benefit
from counseling and would like to be placed on medication to control his mood swings
and anxiety attacks. (UPS! 5/18/06, p.6.)
Furthermore, in State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594, 651 P.2d 527, 528 (1982),
the Idaho Supreme Court noted that family and friend support were factors that should

be considered in the Court's decision as to what is an appropriate sentence.
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Id.

Mr. Hedgecock has the support of his family. His mother, Ms. Gilmore, wrote a letter of
support for him. (Augmentation: Notice of Deposit, Exhibit A.) Ms. Gilmore noted that
Mr. Hedgecock had made great strides in his life. (Augmentation: Notice of Deposit,
Exhibit A.) Mr. Chapman also wrote a letter of support for Mr. Hedgecock noting, "His
parents, my friend and I that study with Troy, and others have noticed a change in Troy.
. . . he seems to view things in a more positive and responsible [manner].
(Augmentation: Notice of Deposit, Exhibit B.)
Mr. Hedgecock's mother and stepfather have offered him a place to stay. (UPSI
1/19/07, pp.1-2.) He is excited about the support he is receiving from his mother and
noted that it "means everything to him right now."

(UPSI 1/19/07, p.2.)

At the

sentencing hearing, Mr. Hedgecock acknowledged that, "I got [sic] the support of my
family, something that's never been there before since I was a kid." (Tr. 1/23/07, p.84,
Ls.19-21.) Mr. Hedgecock also noted that he believes that having his family's support
will "help make a difference this time." (Augmentation: Notice of Deposit, Exhibit C.)
Additionally, Mr. Hedgecock has expressed his remorse for committing the
instant offense. In State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 824 P.2d 135 (Ct. App. 1991), the
Idaho Court of Appeals reduced the sentence imposed, "In light of Alberts' expression of
remorse for his conduct, his recognition of his problem, his willingness to accept
treatment and other positive attributes of his character." Id. 121 Idaho at 204, 824 P.2d
at 209. Mr. Hedgecock has expressed his remorse for committing the instant offense
stating, "I am sorry for making the mistake I did." (UPSI 5/18/06, p.7.)
Mr. Hedgecock has also made a great deal of progress during his incarceration.
Mr. Gibbs, jail administrator for Gooding County, testified that Mr. Hedgecock had taken
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on leadership roles in programming, initiated participation in distance learning for
college credits, attempted to get his GED, enrolled in Cognitive Self-Change group, and
enrolled in Breaking Barriers. (Tr. 1/23/07, p.62, L.6 - p.63, L.18.) Mr. Hedgecock has
made great strides in his self-discovery, completing a criminal inventory, and trying to
change his old behavior. (Tr. 1/23/07, p.64, L.23 - p.65, L.2.)
Additionally, Mr. Hedgecock submitted a letter from Ms. Velasquez, a deputy with
Gooding County Sheriff's Office.

(Augmentation: Notice of Deposit, Exhibit D.)

Ms. Velasquez noted that, "I have been working on developing programs for the
inmates and inmate William T. Hedgecock has been [an] active participant in helping
develop several of the programs."

(Augmentation: Notice of Deposit, Exhibit D.)

Based upon the above mitigating factors, Mr. Hedgecock asserts that the district
court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon him. He asserts
that had the district court properly considered his substance abuse, desire for continued
treatment, mental health issues, friend and family support, remorse, and good behavior
during incarceration, it would have crafted a sentence that focused on his further
rehabilitation rather than incarceration.

111.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Hedgecock's Rule 35
Motion For A Reduction Of Sentence
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the
sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which
may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent,
125 Idaho 251, 253, 869 P.2d 568, 570 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing State v. Forde, 113 Idaho
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21, 740 P.2d 63 (Ct. App.1987) and State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 680 P.2d 869
(Ct. App. 1984)). "The criteria for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are
the same as those applied in determining whether the original sentence was
reasonable." Id. (citing Lopez, 106 Idaho at 450, 680 P.2d at 872). "If the sentence was
not excessive when pronounced, the defendant must later show that it is excessive in
view of new or additional information presented with the motion for reduction. Id. (citing

State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114,822 P.2d 1011 (Ct. App. 1991)). "When presenting
a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of
new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the
Rule 35 motion." State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007).
Mr. Hedgecock supplied additional information to the district court, a letter from
the mother of his son. (R., pp.65-66.) Ms. DeNaughel wrote that:
Really the only thing that Troy and I have in common is our son,
who is now eleven. . .. My son has just recently started to grow a
bond with his dad, and his dad has grown a bond with his son .... I feel
that with
supportiveness and the truth how it is will help in Troy's
rehabilitation. . .. Troy and
need each other. Together with the
help of whoever is willing to help (so many people contribute to recovery
for addicts) we can help him.
(R., p.65.)
Mr. Hedgecock asserts that in light of the above additional information and the
mitigating factors mentioned in section II, which need not be repeated, but are
incorporated by reference, the district court abused its discretion in denying his Rule 35
motion.

24

\

CONCLUSION
Mr. Hedgecock respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's
order of Judgment and Commitment and reverse the order which denied his motion to
suppress. Alternatively, he requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that the order denying his Rule 35 motion be
vacated and the case remanded to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 6th day of March, 2008.

c;lu(~

ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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